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IN THE  
**Supreme Court of the United States**  
OCTOBER TERM, 1986

MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, ET AL.,  
*Petitioners*

v.

W. G. TAYLOR, ET AL.,  
*Respondents*

**PETITION OF MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD  
COMPANY FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO  
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT**

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# I

## QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1) Is it improper for the federal courts to extend their jurisdiction to adjudicate union representation issues when the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, *et seq.*, vests exclusive jurisdiction to an administrative tribunal for prompt resolution of labor disputes?

2) Does the Railway Labor Act preclude a provision in a collective bargaining agreement that stipulates union representation in grievance handling at the company level shall be limited to the craft designated by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement?

II

**DESIGNATED LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO  
THE PROCEEDING IN THE COURT BELOW**

- 1) W. G. Taylor
- 2) K. P. Brockhoeft
- 3) A. J. Ruiz
- 4) Wayne A. Sepcich
- 5) Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
- 6) United Transportation Union
- 7) Missouri Pacific Railroad Company



### III

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .....	I
DESIGNATED LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE COURT BELOW .....	II
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	III
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....	V
OPINIONS BELOW .....	1
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT .....	1
STATUTES AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS INVOLVED .....	2
CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....	2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .....	2
STATEMENT OF FACTS .....	3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .....	11
1. The Courts Below Erroneously Asserted Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over This Dispute .....	12
2. A Conflict Exists Among the Federal Circuits as to the Railway Labor Act .....	14
3. This Case Raises Important Public Questions of Labor Law .....	15
4. The Railway Labor Act does not bar exclusive representation provisions of a collective bargaining agreement and does not establish the right of an employee to be represented by his own union in all company-level grievance hearings .....	20
5. The Decision Below is Not Supported by this Court's Jurisprudence .....	22
CONCLUSION .....	23
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .....	24

#### IV

	Page
APPENDIX A—Opinion of the Court of Appeals .....	1a
APPENDIX B—Opinion of the District Court .....	10a
APPENDIX C—Pertinent Provisions of Railway Labor Act and the Attendant Regulations .....	27a
APPENDIX D—Article 18 of MOPAC-UTU Collective Bargaining Agreement .....	34a
APPENDIX E—Article 23 of MOPAC-UTU Collective Bargaining Agreement .....	35a
APPENDIX F—Affidavit of O. B. Sayers, MOPAC's As- sistant Vice President, Labor Relations ..	37a

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES	Page
45 U.S.C. §§ 151, <i>et seq.</i> .....	1, 2, 4, 6
45 U.S.C. § 152, Second .....	20
45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth .....	20
45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth .....	7, 8, 14
45 U.S.C. § 153, First(i) .....	13, 21
45 U.S.C. § 153, First(j) .....	21
45 U.S.C. § 153, First(m) .....	13
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) .....	1
29 C.F.R. Part 1206 (1983) .....	2, 7
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 .....	3

CASES	Page
<i>Andrews v. Louisville &amp; N.R.R. Co.</i> , 406 U.S. 320 (1972) .....	16, 17
<i>Broady v. Illinois Central Railroad</i> , 199 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1951) .....	14
<i>Brotherhood of Local Firemen &amp; Engineers v. Louisville &amp; N.R. Co.</i> , 400 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1968), <i>cert. denied</i> , 393 U.S. 1050 (1969) .....	10
<i>Brotherhood of Local Firemen &amp; Engineers v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co.</i> , 413 F.2d 19 (8th Cir. 1969), <i>cert. denied</i> , 396 U.S. 963 (1969) .....	10
<i>Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, P&amp;W Railroad Co.</i> , 321 U.S. 50 (1944) .....	13
<i>Butler v. Thompson</i> , 192 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1951) .....	14, 21
<i>Coar v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers</i> , 618 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. N.Y. 1985) .....	6, 15, 22
<i>Conley v. Gibson</i> , 355 U.S. 42 (1957) .....	16
<i>Division 14, Order of R. R. Telegraphers v. Leighty</i> , 298 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1962), <i>cert. denied</i> , 369 U.S. 813 (1962) .....	10
<i>Elgin, Joliet &amp; Eastern Railroad v. Burley</i> , 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945) .....	12, 13
<i>Gen'l Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co.</i> , 320 U.S. 323 .....	8, 9, 14
<i>Gen'l Committee v. Southern Pacific Co.</i> , 320 U.S. 338 .....	8, 9, 10, 14
<i>Hughes Tool Company v. National Labor Relations Board</i> , 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945) .....	17, 18
<i>Landers v. Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp. and BLE</i> , _____ F. Supp. _____ (D. Mass. 1986) .....	6, 15, 20, 21, 22

## VI

### CASES

Page

<i>McElroy v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis</i> , 392 F.2d 966 (7th Cir. 1968) .....	15, 22, 23
<i>Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox</i> , 370 U.S. 650, 85 S. Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965) .....	21
<i>Switchmen's Union v. Nat'l Mediation Bd.</i> , 320 U.S. 297 ..	7, 8, 14

### SECONDARY SOURCES

Archibald Cox, "Collective Bargaining During Contract," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1097 (1950) .....	16
Archibald Cox, "Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing Agreement," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1097, 1100 (1950) .....	21
Archibald Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement", 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1956) .....	16

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**OPINIONS BELOW**

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (Appendix A) is reported at 794 F.2d 1082 (5th Cir. 1986). The opinion of the District Court (Appendix B) is reported at 614 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. La. 1985).

**JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT**

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on July 23, 1986. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

## **STATUTES AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS INVOLVED**

The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 *et seq.* (1972), and 29 C.F.R. Part 1206 (1983) are the focal point in this case. The pertinent provisions of the Railway Labor Act and the attendant regulations are set forth in Appendix C, *infra*.

## **CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

Respondents requested the district court to by-pass the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 151, *et seq.*, and invalidate a common provision in collective bargaining agreements that designate the signatory union as the exclusive representative at company-level grievance hearings. Failing to defer to the National Mediation Board established under the RLA, the district court interjected itself into this labor dispute and held that the contractual undertaking between the United Transportation Union and the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company was invalid. The Court of Appeals, noting the novelty of the legal issues, affirmed. The decisions below are contrary to the Railway Labor Act, and are in conflict with both the rulings by this Court and lower courts.

## **STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and four individuals working as switchmen for the Missouri Pacific filed this lawsuit and alleged that certain provisions of two separate collective bargaining agreements between Missouri Pacific and the United Transportation Union violated the Railway Labor Act ("RLA" or "Act"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164. The BLE plaintiffs sought declara-

tory and injunctive relief seeking to prohibit the Missouri Pacific's adherence to this contractual undertaking, and, the BLE also sought damages on the basis that the challenged grievance procedures prevented the BLE from increasing its membership.

Missouri Pacific filed a motion to dismiss based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which motion was denied by the district court. The BLE and the UTU respectively filed cross motions for summary judgment. Missouri Pacific demonstrated the Court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction and requested the district court to defer to the statutorily-created administrative procedures. MOPAC also presented genuine issues of fact that prevented rendition of summary judgment under FRCP Rule 56.

The district court ruled that it should decide this labor dispute. The district court concluded that the exclusive representation provisions, which provided that only the UTU could represent its members at a company level grievance hearing (which was the same contractual arrangement Missouri Pacific had with the BLE), were not valid with respect to Missouri Pacific's New Orleans facility.

An appeal was taken to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. While recognizing that the issues in this case are serious and substantial, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion. From these erroneous rulings, Missouri Pacific seeks review by this Court.

### **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

Plaintiffs-respondents, W. G. Taylor, K. P. Brockhoeft, A. J. Ruiz, Wayne A. Sepcich, and The Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers ("BLE"), instituted this action against the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company ("MOPAC") and the United Transportation Union ("UTU"). Their Complaint seeks to vitiate certain provisions of the MOPAC/UTU collective bargaining agreement because those provisions allegedly violate the Railway Labor Act ("RLA" or "Act"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164. In particular, the complainants challenge the collective bargaining clause that designates the UTU as the proper representative of its members at company level grievance hearings. The BLE plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit MOPAC's adherence to this contractual undertaking with the UTU as part of their collective bargaining agreement. The complainants also sought money damages but they subsequently withdrew this claim.

Plaintiff/respondents are four New Orleans employees of Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (MOPAC), who worked as switchmen for MOPAC. The United Transportation Union ("UTU") is the collective bargaining representative for the crafts of switchmen and firemen employed by MOPAC. BLE is the collective bargaining representative for the craft of locomotive engineers employed by MOPAC under the Railway Labor Act. MOPAC is a party signatory under separate collective bargaining agreements with BLE and UTU for each craft. Although the individual plaintiffs served as switchmen for the Missouri Pacific, they also are members of the BLE, the engineers' collective representative. At all times relevant to this action, including the time they were disciplined by MOPAC, the individual complainants worked for MOPAC as switchmen.



In 1983 and 1984 the individual MOPAC employees were subject to MOPAC disciplinary proceedings and filed grievances with MOPAC. These grievances and disciplinary proceedings concerned the employees' duties as switchmen while they were working as switchmen.<sup>1</sup> The collective bargaining agreement between MOPAC and UTU provides detailed grievance machinery for switchmen to contest disciplinary action at the company level. Article 18 of the collective bargaining agreement specifies that the UTU is the "duly accredited representative", and, as the exclusive union representative for switchmen, the collective bargaining agreement stipulates that UTU shall protect switchmen interests at company level disciplinary proceedings. (A copy of Article 18 is attached as Appendix D).<sup>2</sup>

The individual employees, despite their constant status as switchmen, additionally are members of the BLE. They claim the right to be represented by the BLE, rather than by the UTU, and further contend that MOPAC's adherence to the collective bargaining agreement violated Sections 2 and 3 of the RLA—despite the undisputed fact that MOPAC was simply acting pursuant to the explicit terms of the bargained agreement negotiated between UTU and MOPAC. The UTU-MOPAC collective bargaining agreement has been in effect for many years and is now being challenged by complainants as the result of the BLE's recent jurisdictional battle

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1. Though Taylor briefly worked as an engineer years prior to this dispute, none of the other individuals involved in the disciplinary hearings have ever worked as engineers for MOPAC.

2. Article 28 of the BLE-MOPAC collective bargaining agreement works the same way, designating BLE as the "duly accredited representative" for company-level proceedings.

with the UTU for membership. Cf. *Landers v. Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp. and BLE*, \_\_\_\_ F. Supp. \_\_\_\_ (D. Mass. 1986) with *Coar v. Metro-North Commuter R. Co.*, 618 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The litigation on the representational issue is apparently a circuitous means of seeking to increase a union's membership.

The collective bargaining agreement between MOPAC and the UTU provides for non-judicial settlement of disputes occurring between MOPAC and its switchmen (MOPAC-UTU Agreement, Paragraphs 18 and 23).<sup>3</sup> Any disagreements over proper interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement itself are to be settled by grievance committees composed of members of MOPAC and the involved union (MOPAC-UTU Agreement, Article 23). Respondents seek to invalidate Article 18 of the MOPAC-UTU agreement, which is an often utilized clause in the collective bargaining process. Abrogation of exclusivity provisions would disrupt federal labor policy and would violate the Railway Labor Act.

This lawsuit is bottomed upon interpretation of the language and policies of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 *et seq.* The RLA, a dispute-settling mechanism, provides an alternative pathway of administrative resolution of railroad labor disputes in lieu of litigation. Yet, the lower courts' rulings contravene the explicit purpose and spirit of the Railway Labor Act.

The present dispute involves the question of which union has the right to represent MOPAC switchmen

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3. A copy of Article 23 of the MOPAC-UTU agreement is appended as Appendix E.

during grievance proceedings at the company level. Reference to the RLA shows that such disputes should be governed by Section 2, Ninth (45 U.S.C. § 152), which states in pertinent part:

If any dispute shall arise among a carrier's employees as to who are the representatives of such employees and authorized in accordance with the requirement of this Act, it shall be the duty of the National Mediation Board, upon request of either party to the dispute, to investigate such dispute. . . .

Section Two, Ninth of the RLA invests exclusive and primary jurisdiction of representation disputes with the National Mediation Board. See also, 29 C.F.R. § 1206, *et seq.* In view of this express statutory directive and the supporting jurisprudence, MOPAC submits that this representational issue is squarely addressed by the RLA. See, *Switchmen's Union v. Nat'l Mediation Board*, 320 U.S. 927 (1943). Instead, the BLE erroneously and prematurely took its representational claims to the district court.

The district court thus erred when it exercised subject matter jurisdiction before the administrative remedies under the RLA were exhausted. The BLE weakly attempts to transform this representational dispute into a question of the validity of the contract itself. This "sleight of hand" argument should not be juridically embraced. Rather, the federal courts should defer to the National Mediation Board to resolve this representational battle between the UTU and the BLE. This is exactly the procedure that was contemplated by Congress. 45 U.S.C. § 152.

Union jurisdictional controversies are not within the authority of the federal courts. Section Two, Ninth (45 U.S.C. § 152), provides that exclusive jurisdiction for settlement of union representational or jurisdictional rights shall be vested with the National Mediation Board. This principle was reaffirmed by this Court in the 1943 trilogy of *Switchmen's Union v. Nat'l Mediation Bd.*, 320 U.S. 297; *Gen'l Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co.*, 320 U.S. 323 (*M-K-T*); and *Gen'l Committee v. Southern Pacific Co.*, 320 U.S. 338. These three cases, like the present case, involved a union's objection to contractual provisions between another union and the carrier. In each case within the jurisdictional trilogy, this Court held that the disputes were not justiciable. They were, instead, classified as matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board. *Ibid.*

In *M-K-T*, *supra*, one union negotiated with the carrier and effected an agreement according it favorable treatment over another union. The displaced union objected and sought to have the contract declared invalid under the Railway Labor Act. In overturning the lower court's rulings on jurisdictional grounds, this Court explained:

It is true that the present controversy grows out of an application of the principles of collective bargaining and majority rule. It involves a jurisdictional dispute—an asserted overlapping of the interests of two crafts. It necessitates a determination of the point where the authority of one craft ends and the other begins or of the zones where they have joint authority. . . . 320 U.S. at 334.

*It seems to us plain that when Congress came to the question of these jurisdictional disputes, it chose not*

*to leave their solution to the courts.* As we have already pointed out, Congress left the present problems far back in the penumbra of those few principles which it codified. Moreover, it selected different machinery for their solution. Congress did not leave the problem of inter-union disputes untouched. It is clear from the legislative history of Section 2, Ninth that it was designed not only to help free unions from the influence . . . of the carriers, but also to resolve a wide range of jurisdictional disputes between unions or between groups of employees. However wide may be the range of jurisdictional disputes embraced within Section 2, Ninth, Congress did not select the courts to resolve them. To the contrary, it fashioned an administrative remedy and left that group of disputes to the National Mediation Board. The present dispute falls within Section 2, Ninth, the administrative remedy is exclusive. 320 U.S. at 336 (emphasis supplied).

In *Gen'l Committee v. Southern Pacific Co.*, 320 U.S. 338 (1943), one union again sought to have another union's agreement with the carrier declared invalid. That agreement affected substantive rights and representational rights in grievance procedures. This Court again refused to reach the merits of the controversy; this Court, finding that the case turned upon an issue similar to the issue in *M-K-T*, stated:

It involves, that is to say, a jurisdictional dispute between two unions. It raises the question whether one collective bargaining agent or the other is the proper representative for the presentation of certain claims to the employer. It involves a determination of the point where the exclusive jurisdiction of one craft ends and where the authority of another craft begins. For the reasons stated in our opinions in

the *Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co.* case and in the *Switchmen's* case, we believe that Congress left the so-called jurisdictional controversies between unions to agencies or tribunals other than the courts. We see no reason for differentiating this jurisdictional dispute from the others. . . . 320 U.S. at 343-344.

These decisions by the Court are not isolated in the jurisprudence. The federal judiciary repeatedly has determined that the National Mediation Board—not the federal courts—has exclusive jurisdiction concerning disputes over union jurisdiction. See, e.g., *Brotherhood of Local Firemen & Engineers v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co.*, 413 F.2d 19 (8th Cir. 1969), *cert. denied*, 396 U.S. 963 (1969); *Brotherhood of Local Firemen & Engineers v. Louisville & N.R. Co.*, 400 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1968), *cert. denied*, 393 U.S. 1050 (1969); *Division 14, Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Leighty*, 298 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1962), *cert. denied*, 369 U.S. 813 (1962).

The BLE has not attempted to challenge the correctness of these judicial rulings. The BLE has not even attempted to distinguish these decisions.

Noting that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction deserved "serious consideration and discussion", the Court of Appeals below found that the exclusive representation provisions of the collective bargaining agreements were properly considered by the trial court. The Court of Appeals also held that the collective bargaining provisions could be ignored as unenforceable. The intermediate court's ruling is in conflict with both the Railway Labor Act and this Court's interpretation of the Act.

The Court of Appeals' rationale is faulty and should be corrected. Pretermittting the erroneous exercise of juris-



diction, the pivotal substantive issue is whether the provisions of the MOPAC-UTU collective bargaining agreement, limiting all switchmen, including those who were members of the BLE, to UTU representation at company level grievance and disciplinary proceedings, is valid under the RLA. The Court of Appeals decision recognized that no single provision of the RLA was dispositive of this issue. The court below acknowledged that its holding was an "attempt to divine Congressional intent and priorities"; its attempt failed. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals extracted a legislative intent, though not stated in the RLA, that ostensibly precludes the language in the UTU/MOPAC collective bargaining agreement. Such judicial prescience is ill-founded and does not support the erroneous decision below.

Besides failing to reconcile its decision with the conflicting case law rendered by this Court, the Court of Appeals did not properly address the policy considerations of labor turmoil and circumvention of the RLA that will be fostered under its ruling.

### **REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION**

If this decision is allowed to stand, a situation detrimental to the most basic purpose and policy of the Railway Labor Act is created, namely, the resolution of labor disputes through experienced administrative agencies rather than a rush to the federal courthouse. The lower court's decision additionally encourages union skirmishes for more territory, rather than allowing the employer and employee to abide by the governing collective bargaining agreement to resolve labor issues. Coupled with these important policy considerations in the railroad labor area

is the existing division among courts with respect to whether members of a union are bound by their collective bargaining agreements with the Railroad. This Court's latest pronouncement is at odds with the Fifth Circuit's ruling below. In order to establish the demarcation line between the statutorily-created administrative agencies and the judiciary in the railroad labor field, this Court should grant certiorari and denote the proper parameters for the collective bargaining process.

More specifically, this Court should grant the present application for review because:

**1. The Courts Below Erroneously Asserted Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over This Dispute.**

The Railway Labor Act classifies labor disputes as "minor" or "major". Major disputes concern:

[f]ormation of collective bargaining agreements or efforts to secure them. They arise whether there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change the terms of one, and therefore the issue is not whether an existing agreement controls the controversy.

In contrast, a minor dispute:

. . . contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already concluded. . . . [T]he dispute relates either to the meaning or proper application of the particular provision with reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case.

See, *Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railroad v. Burley*, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945).



The initial step towards settling either type of dispute is not resort to the courts. It is negotiation. Major disputes under the Act go first to mediation under the auspices of the National Mediation Board; if that fails, then to the acceptance or rejection of arbitration, and lastly, to possible presidential intervention to secure adjustment. *Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railroad v. Burley*, *supra*; see, *Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, P&W Railroad Co.*, 321 U.S. 50 (1944).

Minor disputes are handled quite differently. Section 153, First(i) of the Railway Labor Act provides that minor disputes at the company level arise:

. . . out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, roles or working conditions . . . and shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes.

If the employer and employees cannot resolve the pending labor dispute, the RLA provides that the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the National Railroad Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes. Actions of the Adjustment Board are “. . . final and binding upon both parties to the dispute.” 45 U.S.C. § 153, First(m).

Thus, the Railway Labor Act is designed to provide private consideration of issues of contract interpretation and union representation. However, the courts below, rather than classifying this dispute as either “major” or “minor”, treated this dispute as a question regarding the validity of the MOPAC-UTU agreement, and on this

tenuous basis, the trial court asserted subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner submits that this exercise of subject matter jurisdiction by the lower court was over-reaching and should be rectified by this Court.

As noted earlier, assertion of subject matter jurisdiction in this case is in direct conflict with the clear holdings of this Court as expressed in the 1943 trilogy of *Switchmen's Union v. Nat'l Mediation Board*, *supra*; *General Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co.*, *supra*; and *General Committee v. Southern Pacific Co.*, *supra*. This grouping of cases reaffirmed the meaning of Section 152, Ninth of the Railway Labor Act to the effect that the courts should defer to the administrative tribunals established for this express purpose.

Respondents seek to have the federal courts substituted for the administrative remedies provided by the Railway Labor Act. This circumvention of the Act undermines Congress' efforts to maintain industrial self-government and labor peace under the RLA procedures.

## **2. A Conflict Exists Among the Federal Circuits as to the Railway Labor Act.**

The substantive issue before the Fifth Circuit in this case was whether the Railway Labor Act provides that an employee can have a representative of his choice handle grievances at the company level, thereby rendering unenforceable collective bargaining agreement language designating the signatory union as the exclusive representative for the company level dispute.

In *Broady v. Illinois Central Railroad*, 199 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1951) and in *Butler v. Thompson*, 192 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1951), the Seventh and Eighth Circuits

concluded that the Railway Labor Act did not give employees the right to representatives of their own choice at company-level grievance and disciplinary proceedings. Although the Seventh Circuit in *McElroy* subsequently disallowed exclusive representation under a collective bargaining agreement, the ruling in *McElroy*, as the district court in this case acknowledged, was limited to a unique factual situation, which does not exist in the case *sub judice*.

Lack of agreement in the federal court system on the validity of exclusive representation clauses is wide spread. For example, in *Coar v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad*, 618 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. N.Y. 1985), the court held that an employee should have choice of representation at company-level proceedings. In contradistinction, the Court in *Landers v. Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp.*, \_\_\_\_ F. Supp. \_\_\_\_ (D. Mass. 1986) held that the Railway Labor Act does not supersede the collective bargaining agreement to provide an employee with such unfettered discretion. Rejecting the argument that an employee can ignore the contractual, designation of his representative, the Court in *Landers* maintained the integrity of the collective bargaining agreement. The *Landers* ruling has been appealed, and if affirmed by the First Circuit, an additional appellate conflict will exist on whether this collective bargaining clause (Article 18), predetermining the employee representative, is invalid under the Railway Labor Act.

### **3. This Case Raises Important Public Questions of Labor Law.**

The Railway Labor Act is designed to fit within the overall goals of federal labor law. Congress has always

intended to establish and maintain a uniform body of federal labor law directed toward industrial self-government and labor peace. The structural components of this policy are the construction of private dispute settling structures and adherence to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. *See generally*, Archibald Cox, "Collective Bargaining During Contract," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1097 (1950).

Union rivalry frustrates industrial self-government and labor harmony. If the exclusive representation clause of the collective bargaining contract is not enforced, each employee will be permitted to select his or her own representative for every company level grievance hearing. This effect is exacerbated by the existence of multiple unions at each facility.

The employees already have a voice in the selection of their representative through approval of the collective bargaining agreement. Abrogating the collectively bargained for provisions will result in labor chaos. The courts historically have recognized that the process of handling grievances is an integral part of collective bargaining, and, therefore, the concept of exclusive representation in the agreement confected between unions and employers must control. *See, Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 42 (1957). *See also, Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co.*, 406 U.S. 320 (1972); Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement", 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1956). The courts below did not heed this established tenet of labor management relations. Petitioner respectfully submits that the lower courts' rulings eviscerate the collective bargaining process in the railroad industry.

Grievance procedures specified in a collective bargaining agreement are not optional provisions for employees. They are binding contractual provisions that govern company proceedings and are subject to interpretive scrutiny only by the National Railroad Adjustment Board. *Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co.*, *supra*. In *Andrews*, a wrongful discharge complaint was dismissed because the employee had failed to exhaust his remedies before the NRAB. This Court recognized that an employee is bound to accept the limitations, as well as the benefits, of a collective bargaining agreement. (See related discussion relative to the propriety of exclusive representation clauses in Section 4, *infra*). This principle, illustrated by this Court's ruling in *Andrews*, was noted approvingly by the district court in the instant case, but inexplicably neither court below chose to adhere to this well-established precept.

In *Hughes Tool Company v. National Labor Relations Board*, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945), the court noted that with respect to representation of an employee at a grievance hearing, the phrase “. . . representatives of their own choosing” was not made part of the National Labor Relations Act because this approach would be antithetical to labor harmony:

It was not thought good to allow grievance hearings to become clashes between rival unions. We think an inexperienced griever can ask a more experienced friend to assist him, but he cannot present his grievance through any union except the representative. *Id.* at 73.

In the present case, neither the RLA nor the relevant collective bargaining provision employs the phrase “. . .

of their own choosing." The same reasoning espoused by the Fifth Circuit in *Hughes Tool* applied to the instant case. Instead of reaching a prompt resolution of a grievance at the company level, grievance hearings will merely provide the forum for jurisdictional competition among unions if the lower court's ruling is not corrected.

The ruling of the court below will create a situation in which it will be too facile for a rival union to influence and attempt to alter the provisions of a collective bargaining contract to which it is not a party, and which does not reflect the actual working conditions of its own craft. If the BLE is allowed to represent switchmen in UTU disciplinary and union grievance matters, nothing prevents the BLE from pursuing positions contrary to the oral and written understandings that exist between the UTU and MOPAC.

The legislative intent of the RLA, to the extent that it was to encourage freedom of association among employees and amicable resolution of labor grievances, did not extend to creating fertile ground for freewheeling union rivalry. If a union other than the signatory union, as a result of non-enforcement of exclusivity provisions, is able to decide which cases to pursue or is able to offer conflicting interpretations of provisions of the signatory's contract, the non-signatory union will be encouraged to pursue frivolous claims or grievances normally not pursued by the signatory union in an effort to improve the non-signatory's appeal to employees. MOPAC, as any other carrier, would be impeded in achieving meaningful, long term collective bargaining agreements with unions. Inconsistent results in disciplinary and grievance matters arising from identical contractual provisions would



quickly flourish. The ensuing unfairness would inevitably lead to labor unrest and interruptions of commerce, and the precise purpose of the RLA will be wholly thwarted. The BLE will be placed in the unusual and non-productive position of being required to interpret UTU agreements with MOPAC whenever the BLE represents a switchman. MOPAC and every other railroad will be left in the middle of what is rapidly evolving into an eternal turf battle between rival unions seeking to attract new members. For these reasons, this Court should correct the erroneous decisions by the intermediate court.

In the instant case, sixteen separate unions have sixteen separate agreements with MOPAC. If every employee is free to be represented by a representative "of his own choosing" at a company-level grievance proceeding, MOPAC is faced with sixteen unions competing with each other to represent that employee. Under these circumstances, the collective bargaining agreement between MOPAC and the UTU, as well as other unions, would be virtually worthless. The affidavit of O. B. Sayers, MOPAC's Vice President for Labor Relations, set forth the only evidence presented to the trial court as to the adverse effect of multiple union handling of grievances upon labor stability; the Sayers affidavit established that permitting grievances to be handled by more than one union will quickly destabilize labor relations. (Affidavit of O. B. Sayers, ¶ 1, §§ 19-25, which is attached as Appendix F).

The Railway Labor Act contains measures to permit union employees a broad range of choice in selecting their representatives at grievance hearings. However, the employees' selection of a representative cannot be un-

fettered. After the employees have chosen their designated representative by means of a collective bargaining agreement, they should not be free to vitiate the union majority's choice. Otherwise, a virtual donnybrook between rival unions will be created if the exclusivity provisions, such as the one in Article 18 of the MOPAC-UTU collective bargaining agreement, is nullified by the court's ruling.

- 4. The Railway Labor Act does not bar exclusive representation provisions of a collective bargaining agreement and does not establish the right of an employee to be represented by his own union in all company-level grievance hearings.**

Section 152, Second, of the RLA, when read together with Section 152, Fourth, of the Act, reveals that the statutory method for designating a representative for collective bargaining purposes is by majority vote of those employees interested in the bargaining. The collective bargaining agent so chosen is the exclusive representative of the union's employees with respect to all facets of bargaining. Exclusivity in this respect is a tradition which has long lent stability to labor relations. (See Sayers Affidavit, Appendix F)

The right to belong to the union of one's choice does not automatically include the subsidiary right of totally free choice as to representation in company-level disputes. See, e.g., *Landers v. Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp.*, *supra*. The court below erred by failing to recognize this balancing concept inherent in the RLA.

Analysis of the RLA reveals that there is no statutory basis for individual choice in selecting a representative



for company-level grievance handling when a collective bargaining agreement has been approved by the union workers. Because Section 153, First(j) of the RLA sets forth that disputes must be handled by the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB), the specificity of that language demonstrates that Congress was capable of expressing, and did express, exactly how representation under the Act should be handled. Section 153, First(i) of the Act, providing that company-level disputes should be resolved in the "usual manner," discloses that Congress did not intend to afford union members absolute choice in representation at the company level. Nothing in the Railway Labor Act can be construed as a bar to an exclusive representation clause in favor of the craft signatory to the collective bargaining contract. See, *Landers v. Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp.*, *supra*; *Butler v. Thompson*, *supra*.

The judiciary should not fail to recognize the long-settled principle that resolution of particular grievances and disciplinary issues, even if many are strictly personal to an employee and do not directly touch the overall interests of a union or craft, ultimately do affect the administration of a collective bargaining agreement, and will ultimately reach those interests. Individual resolutions of grievances, in time, become precedents by which later disputes are decided. *Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox*, 370 U.S. 650, 85 S. Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965); *Landers, supra*; Cox, "Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing Agreement," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1097, 1100 (1950). Hence, the need for enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement is apparent; adherence to this contractual undertaking between MOPAC and the unions preserves labor peace and permits self-governance.

### 5. The Decision Below is Not Supported by this Court's Jurisprudence.

*McElroy v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis*, 392 F.2d 966 (7th Cir. 1968), is the primary jurisprudential authority for the decision below. Though the Fifth Circuit relied upon the district court decision in *Coar v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers*, 618 F. Supp. 380 (S.D. N.Y. 1985) (which was not binding upon the Fifth Circuit), the district court in *Coar* merely piggybacked upon *McElroy*. Yet *McElroy* is factually different from the present case, and more significantly, the factual situation in *McElroy* was an historical anomaly. The employees in *McElroy* constantly shuttled back and forth between two crafts depending upon the needs of the carrier; such are not the facts in the present case. In a shuttling situation, the "usual manner" under 45 U.S.C. § 153 conceivably could allow for nonexclusive representation for handling of grievances at the company level. If the employee does not shuttle between crafts, the peculiar reasoning by the court in *McElroy* does not apply and the collective bargaining procedures must be followed. The court below erred by failing to appreciate this critical distinction, and, as a result, union rivalry will proliferate.

In this case, as in *Landers*, the original company-level disputes occurred while the employees were working as switchmen. The UTU represents all switchmen under its collective bargaining agreement with MOPAC, while the BLE is the bargaining agent for locomotive engineers. Thus, it is undisputed from the record that shuttling between crafts does not exist in this case. Without a finding of shuttling, the Fifth Circuit erred by relying upon the

rationale in *McElroy*. Hence, the Court of Appeals' ruling is directly contrary to the RLA.

The holding by the Seventh Circuit in *McElroy* has been inappropriately expanded by the court below. This expansion is simply wrong under existing case law. Such an erroneous ruling on an important labor concept must be rectified to avoid the destruction of the collective bargaining process.

### CONCLUSION

MOPAC respectfully requests this Court to grant its petition for a writ of certiorari in order to maintain labor peace and comply with the statutory directives of the Railway Labor Act. Review by this Court is warranted so that labor/management disputes in the railroad industry can be resolved by mediation, as contemplated by Congress when it enacted the Railway Labor Act, and without court intercession. The division among courts on the important labor policy of whether exclusive representation clauses violate the RLA make it essential that this Court grant the instant application for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that I have on this 21st day of October, 1986, served three copies of the foregoing Petition upon the following, by placing same in the United States mail, properly addressed and first class postage prepaid:

- (1) Counsel for plaintiffs,  
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HARRY A. ROSENBERG

**APPENDIX A**

**W. G. TAYLOR, et al.,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,**

**v.**

**MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,  
et al., Defendants-Appellants.**

**No. 85-3519.**

**United States Court of Appeals,  
Fifth Circuit.**

**July 23, 1986.**

Railroad switchmen who were members of engineers union rather than switchmen's union brought action seeking declaration that exclusive representation provisions of collective bargaining agreement between railroad and switchmen's union violated their rights under Railway Labor Act and seeking injunction prohibiting enforcement of the provisions. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Adrian G. Duplantier, J., 614 F.Supp. 1320, granted the requested relief, and railroad appealed. The Court of Appeals, Politz, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) district court had subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) exclusive representation provisions of switchmen's union's collective bargaining agreements were invalid as applied.

**Affirmed.**

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Norton N. Newborn, Cleveland Ohio, for United Trans.

Harry A. Rosenberg, Phelps, Dunbar, et al., New Orleans, La., for Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.

Harold A. Ross, Cleveland, Ohio, Louis L. Robein, Metairie, La., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before GEE, POLITZ, and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Circuit Judge:

The district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief sought by four individual plaintiffs and by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) pursuant to the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 *et seq.* 614 F.Supp. 1320 (E.D. La. 1985). Defendants Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (MOPAC) and the United Transportation Union (UTU) appeal, challenging the court's jurisdiction and its contractual interpretation. Concluding that the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter, that the claims are justiciable, and that the district court was correct in its analysis, we affirm.

### BACKGROUND

The four individual plaintiffs are employees of MOPAC and members of BLE, a craft union that is the exclusive bargaining representative for MOPAC's locomotive engineers. The individual plaintiffs are not engineers, however, but switchmen in MOPAC's Avondale, Louisiana yard, enjoying only a "first preference" to trans-

fer into engine service. UTU is certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for MOPAC's switchmen.

During 1983 and 1984 the individual plaintiffs were involved in company-level disciplinary or grievance proceedings. In each instance they requested representation by the BLE. MOPAC refused these requests on the grounds that the MOPAC-UTU collective bargaining agreement specified that only the UTU could represent a switchman at company-level disciplinary and grievance hearings.

The instant complaint sought: (1) a declaration that the provisions of the MOPAC-UTU collective bargaining agreement limiting switchmen to UTU representation at company-level proceedings violated the individual plaintiffs' rights under the RLA; (2) an injunction prohibiting enforcement of these provisions; and (3) damages, a claim subsequently waived.

MOPAC moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the claims involved disputes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Mediation Board (NMB), the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB), or a special adjustment board. The district court found jurisdiction and, on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, held for the plaintiffs in a scholarly and comprehensive opinion. To the extent that the MOPAC-UTU exclusive representation provisions prevented a switchman from selecting his own union to represent him at company-level proceedings, the provisions were declared void and their enforcement enjoined.<sup>1</sup> MOPAC and UTU appeal.

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1. The injunction was made prospective only since the claims of the individual plaintiffs had been mooted.



## ANALYSIS

*Subject-matter Jurisdiction*

Contending that the dispute at bar falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NMB, NRAB, or a special adjustment board, MOPAC challenges the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter. The point deserves serious consideration and discussion.

[1] Under the RLA, disputes between an employer and its employees, and the union representing the employees, are characterized as "major," "minor," or "representation." Under 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i), minor disputes "growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions . . . may be referred . . . to the [National Railroad] Adjustment Board. . . ." See generally *International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Texas International Airlines, Inc.*, 717 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1983) ("*IBT v. TIA*"). MOPAC vigorously maintains that plaintiffs' claims involve the interpretation of the MOPAC-UTU collective bargaining agreement. Notwithstanding MOPAC's skillful argument to the contrary, we conclude that the pertinent contractual provisions, reprinted in 614 F.Supp. at 1325-26, are clear and unambiguous and require no interpretation. Accordingly, the NRAB has no jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims, and, *a fortiori*, neither would a special adjustment board. 45 U.S.C. § 153 Second (special adjustment board may decide "disputes of the character specified in" 45 U.S.C. § 153).<sup>2</sup>

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2. MOPAC does not argue that the instant claims present a "major dispute" under the RLA. See 45 U.S.C. § 156; *IBT v. TIA*.



MOPAC's argument that the plaintiffs' claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NMB is more substantial. The NMB has exclusive jurisdiction over representation disputes involving the determination of the proper representative of a class of employees. 45 U.S.C. § 152 Ninth; *IBT v. TIA*. At first blush, a functional analysis would reflect that MOPAC's position is sound. By gaining BLE representation at company-level proceedings, the argument posits, the plaintiffs could trigger a conflict between the BLE and the UTU. BLE representation of BLE-represented switchmen at company-level proceedings could, conceivably, undercut UTU's position as the exclusive bargaining representative of the switchmen. Were such a dispute between BLE and UTU to occur, and were it to implicate UTU's bargaining position, we would be faced with a representation dispute within the NMB's exclusive jurisdiction. That is not, however, the situation presented by the instant case.

[2] As the district court astutely recognized, it is the plaintiffs' position that the exclusive representation provisions at bar are *invalid* when applied to hearings involving switchmen who are not members of the UTU. Whether a provision of a collective bargaining agreement is valid is a legal decision, classic grist for the judicial mill. *Felter v. Southern Pacific Co.*, 359 U.S. 326, 79 S. Ct. 847, 3 L.Ed.2d 854 (1959). The district court properly took jurisdiction over this case. 614 F.Supp. at 1322. *Accord McElroy v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis*, 392 F.2d 966 (7th Cir. 1968), *cert. denied*, 393 U.S. 1015, 89 S. Ct. 610, 21 L.Ed.2d 559 (1969); *Coar v. Metro-North Commuter R. Co.*, 618 F.Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

*Right of Representation*

[3] The issue posed by this appeal is whether the provisions of the MOPAC-UTU collective bargaining agreement, limiting all switchmen, including those who are members of the BLE, to UTU representation at company-level grievance and disciplinary proceedings, are valid under the RLA. Finding no single provision of the RLA dispositive of this issue, we must attempt to divine congressional intent and priorities.

The general purposes of the RLA are set out in 45 U.S.C. § 151a:

The purposes of the Act are: (1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employees or any denial as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization; (3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of this Act; (4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.

In addition to the prohibition on "any limitation upon freedom of association among employees" contained in 45 U.S.C. § 151a(2), Section 2 Eleventh (c) of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (c), provides that while a collective bargaining agreement may require an employee to belong to a national labor union as a condition

of employment, it cannot mandate which union. These provisions persuade us that Congress attached significant importance to an employee's freedom to choose his or her representative and to belong to the union preferred by the employee.

The right to associate freely with a national union of an employee's own choosing, and the effects of the exercise of that right, however, are not unlimited. In the instant case, for example, the BLE switchmen are not entitled to have BLE negotiate a separate collective bargaining agreement for them; rather, the terms and conditions of their employment necessarily are governed by the MOPAC-UTU agreement covering switchmen. *See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co.*, 323 U.S. 192, 65 S. Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944). On the other hand, given the apparent importance Congress attached to freedom of choice, that right should be limited only when compelled by express language of the RLA. We find neither statutory language mandating such a result nor compelling reason to limit the right of free choice in the instant case. Indeed, we perceive the opposite.

In exercising the freedom to choose membership in a national union, an employee may consider myriad factors: some personal, some business-related; some apparent, others less apparent; some objectively, soundly based, others perhaps questionable; all reflecting the essence of free choice. An employee selecting a union opts for the benefits, burdens, and costs attendant upon membership in that union. In return, the union owes the member certain duties. The relationship is symbiotic. An obvious and primary benefit to the employee is the right to have the chosen union provide personal representation in any dispute the employee might have with the employer. Such

typically are matters of great interest and concern to the individual employee.

Because the UTU was the exclusive bargaining agent for MOPAC's switchmen during the contract-negotiation process, the benefits of membership in the BLE were necessarily sublimated. To extend that sublimation beyond contract negotiation to include company-level grievance and disciplinary proceedings would render membership in the BLE nugatory, and make that union the equivalent of a social organization rather than a vital national labor union of railroad employees. That extension would effectively nullify the RLA's specific emphasis on the employee's freedom to choose a union in situations as are here presented.

The district court's decision manifestly is consistent with the stated goals of the RLA. Only specific language of the RLA would warrant rejecting the trial court's findings and conclusions. We have been cited to no such language, and find none.

The RLA provision applicable to company-level proceedings is § 2 Second, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Second, which provides:

All disputes between a carrier or carriers and its or their employees shall be considered, and, if possible, decided, with all expedition, in conference between representatives designated and authorized so to confer, respectively, by the carrier or carriers and by the employees thereof interested in the dispute.

The language pertinent to the instant inquiry is "representatives designated and authorized . . . to confer . . . by the employees . . . interested in the dispute." Does

this language refer only to the certified bargaining agent, or does it include the national union to which the employee belongs? We are persuaded to the latter.

Under this statute, company-level proceedings are to involve a representative "designated . . . by the employees . . . interested in the dispute." The reference is not generic, it is individualized. The craft or body of switchmen might be interested only inferentially in a particular disciplinary or grievance hearing, which might be entirely fact-bound with no overriding policy implications. The individual, in such an instance, would have a vital interest; that individual is the employee "interested in the dispute." The individual should be permitted to select his or her representative. Only in that manner would the heralded right to free selection of union membership be accorded the status and dignity explicit and implicit in the relevant statutes.

We conclude by noting that our decision today accords with the holdings or leanings of our colleagues in the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. *McElroy; General Committee of Adjustment v. Burlington Northern, Inc.*, 503 F.2d 1279 (8th Cir. 1977); *Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co.*, 411 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1969); *accord Coar*. We further note that our holding today creates no conflict between the RLA policy of freedom of union choice for the employee and the stated goals of company-level settlement of disputes, 45 U.S.C. § 152 First, and the transcending desire for labor-management stability. *See Coar*, 618 F.Supp. at 384 (quoting pertinent congressional testimony).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

**APPENDIX B**

**W.G. TAYLOR, K.P. Brockhoeft, A.J. Ruiz,  
Wayne A. Sepcich and Brotherhood of  
Locomotive Engineers**

**v.**

**MISSOURI PACIFIC RR CO. and  
United Transportation Union.**

**Civ. A. No. 84-700.**

**United States District Court,  
E.D. Louisiana.**

**March 20, 1985.**

Railway union and individual members brought action seeking declaration that exclusive representation provisions of agreements between railway and second union violated employees' rights under Railway Labor Act and were null and void. The District Court, Duplantier, J., held that Railway Labor Act rendered null and unenforceable exclusive representation provisions of agreements insofar as they prevent member of railway union from seeking his own union rather than bargaining representative union of craft in which he was working to assist him at company level proceedings.

Order accordingly.

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Harold A. Ross, Cleveland, Ohio, Louis L. Robein, Jr., Metairie, La., for plaintiffs.

Dennis M. Angelico, New Orleans, La., Norton N. Newborn, Cleveland, Ohio, for United Transp. Union.

Harry & Rosenberg, New Orleans, La., for Missouri Pacific R.R. Co.

## ORDER AND REASONS

DUPLANTIER, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Taylor, Brockhoeft, Ruiz and Sepcich are railway workers employed by defendant Missouri Pacific Railroad Company ("MOPAC"). Plaintiff Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers ("BLE"), of which the individual plaintiffs are members, is the collective bargaining representative pursuant to the Railway Labor Act ("RLA" or "Act"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1972), for the craft of locomotive engineers employed by MOPAC. Defendant United Transportation Union ("UTU") is the collective bargaining representative for the crafts of switchmen and firemen employed by MOPAC. The rates of pay, rules, and working conditions for the crafts employed by MOPAC are established by agreement between MOPAC and the collective bargaining representative of each respective craft. Although the individual plaintiffs are members of BLE, the engineer's collective representative, they work principally as switchmen.

At various times during late 1983 and early 1984 the individual plaintiffs either were subjects of MOPAC disciplinary proceedings or filed grievances with MOPAC. In all instances, the grievances and disciplinary



proceedings concerned the plaintiffs' services as switchmen.

The individual plaintiffs sought representation by their union, BLE, at the MOPAC disciplinary and grievance proceedings. MOPAC, however, refused their requests, basing its position on provisions of two collective bargaining agreements between MOPAC and UTU that establish terms and conditions of employment for MOPAC switchmen: Articles 18 and 23 of the January 1, 1974, Agreement and Section 17 of the August 11, 1948, Agreement. (*See Appendix*). The parties to this suit agree that these provisions are intended to limit a switchman's choice of representatives before a disciplinary or grievance proceeding to himself or a UTU representative, even though that switchman may be a member of BLE rather than UTU. Thus, the provisions vest in UTU an exclusive right to represent MOPAC employees in proceedings concerning switchmen services.

The individual plaintiffs, joined by BLE, instituted this action in which they seek a declaration that the exclusive representation provisions of the UTU/MOPAC agreements violate employees' rights under the RLA and are null and void insofar as they restrict plaintiffs' rights to have their grievances and disciplinary matters handled at all levels by BLE representatives.<sup>1</sup> We now consider extensively briefed cross motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs and by defendant UTU.

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1. We defer consideration of further relief sought by plaintiff, including prospective injunctive relief, the nullification of the proceedings at which plaintiffs were denied BLE representation, and BLE's claim for damages against MOPAC for loss of membership resulting from MOPAC's refusal to treat with BLE representatives.

[1] Defendant MOPAC opposes both motions for summary judgment. To the extent that MOPAC's opposition resurrects the question of this court's jurisdiction to adjudicate this labor dispute, we reiterate our ruling on MOPAC's previously considered motion to dismiss. Contrary to MOPAC's contentions, this case does not present a "major dispute" regarding the jurisdiction of competing unions over which the National Mediation Board has exclusive jurisdiction. RLA Section 2, Ninth (45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth). This case presents no issue about UTU's authority to make agreements with MOPAC relating to the working conditions, rules, and pay of MOPAC switchmen. *See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley*, 325 U.S. 711, 65 S. Ct. 1282, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1945). Nor is this matter a "minor dispute" arising out of a grievance or dispute regarding the interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agreement provision, over which the National Railroad Adjustment Board, RLA Section 3, First (i), or alternatively, a Special Adjustment Board, RLA Section 3, Second, may have exclusive jurisdiction. The parties agree that the challenged provisions of the UTU/MOPAC agreements purport to create an exclusive right of UTU to represent switchmen at all MOPAC company level proceedings. The issue presented is whether these exclusive representation provisions can prevent a member of the BLE from choosing as his representative at a company level grievance or disciplinary proceeding a BLE union official, in view of the rights of employees under the RLA. Since the issue is one of validity, not interpretation, it is for judicial consideration. *See Felter v. Southern Pacific Co.*, 359 U.S. 326, 327 n. 3, 79 S. Ct. 847, 850 n. 3, 3 L.Ed.2d 854 (1959); *Order of Railway Conductors & Brakemen v. Switchmen's Union of North*

*America*, 269 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1959). Nothing in the RLA restricts the court's jurisdiction to determine whether the exclusive representation provisions of the UTU/MOPAC agreements are valid.

[2] The factual disputes are minimal and, in any event, immaterial. The resolution of this matter turns on a pure question of law. Therefore, the case is ripe for summary judgment. We conclude that plaintiffs are entitled to relief and order judgment accordingly.

At the outset of our analysis we note that the language of the Act provides no clear answer to the question before us. Furthermore, we find no binding precedent. Indeed, of the several reported decisions concerning representational rights in minor disputes, only two directly address the narrow question with which we are concerned: an employee's right under the Act to designate as his representative at company level dispute proceedings the railway union of which he is a member but which is not the certified bargaining representative of the craft in which he was working at the time the dispute arose. See *McElroy v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis*, 392 F.2d 966 (7th Cir. 1968), *cert. den.*, 393 U.S. 1015, 89 S. Ct. 610, 21 L.Ed.2d 559 (1969); *General Committee of Adjustment of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers for Pacific Lines of Southern Pacific Co. v. Southern Pac. Co.*, 132 F.2d 194 (9th Cir.), *rev'd on other grounds*, 320 U.S. 338, 64 S. Ct. 142, 88 L.Ed. 85 (1943). Only one case, *McElroy*, is an action by a member of one craft union seeking to nullify the exclusive representation agreement between the employer and the collective bargaining agent union for the craft in which the employee was working when the dispute arose.

Absent prohibition by the Act, the exclusive representation agreements would be valid and enforceable contractual provisions, although they prevent an employee from having his own union represent him at company level proceedings involving a labor contract with a different union. The reported decisions interpreting the Act vis-a-vis an employee's choice of representative exemplify the diverse interpretations to which the Act lends itself. The disparate results and reasoning in these decisions suggest two reasonable assessments of the Act. First, the Act's failure to address the specific issue before us may be caused by the failure of the drafters to anticipate such a dispute. Alternatively, Congress might have intended a definite stance on the issue; if so, the draftsmanship of the Act is wanting in clarity.

[3] Reading the language of the Act "not in a vacuum, but in the light of the policies [it] was intended to serve," *Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Rychlik*, 352 U.S. 480, 488, 77 S. Ct. 421, 425, 1 L.Ed.2d 480 (1957), we conclude that under the Act the individual plaintiffs are entitled to designate their union, BLE, to represent them in company level proceedings notwithstanding the UTU/MOPAC agreements to the contrary. We hold that the Act renders null and unenforceable the exclusive representation provisions of the UTU/MOPAC agreements insofar as they prevent a member of a railway union from selecting his own union rather than the bargaining representative union of the craft in which he is working to assist him at company level proceedings. We do not pass upon the question of whether an employee has a right under the Act to select any person or organization other than his own union as his representative at company level proceedings.

The general purposes of the Act are delineated in RLA Section 2 (45 U.S.C. § 151a). Section 2 reflects the congressional intent to create and maintain stable relations between labor and management in a vital national industry. See *Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R. Co.*, 353 U.S. 30, 77 S. Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622 (1957). One of the specific objectives of the Act is to forbid "any limitation upon freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of employees to join a labor organization." RLA Section 2(2) (45 U.S.C. § 151a(2)). Inherent in the right of an employee to join a railway employees labor union of his choice is the right to enjoy fully the fundamental benefits of union membership. It is difficult to conceive of a benefit of union membership more fundamental than union representation in employee/employer dispute proceedings.

In the 1951 amendments to the Act concerning union shops in the railroad industry, Congress reaffirmed each employee's right to belong to a railway union of his choice. Through Section 2, Eleventh, Congress allowed carriers and unions to establish union shop requirements, which make membership in a union a condition of employment. However, a typical union shop agreement could cause significant problems because of an unusual characteristic of the railroad industry: the shuttling back and forth between crafts (and union jurisdiction) of employees traditionally organized along craft lines. To forestall such problems, Congress included in the union shop section of the Act a specific provision to the effect that membership in any railway employees union national in scope satisfies the union membership requirement of any other such union's contract with the employer. "The require-

ment of membership in a labor organization in an agreement . . . shall be satisfied, as to both a present or future employee in engine, train, yard, or hostling service . . . if said employee shall hold or acquire membership in any one of the labor organizations, national in scope, organized in accordance with this chapter, and admitting to membership employees of a craft or class in any of said services. . . ." RLA Section 2, Eleventh (c) (45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (c)). It is not disputed that both UTU and BLE are the type of labor organizations referred to in the quoted provision.

This recognition of an employee's right to maintain his union membership while working in a craft not represented by his union was designed to protect employees from the expense of being required to belong to more than one union or the likely loss of union benefits that would result if an employee were required periodically to shift his union membership. *See Rychlik, supra*, 352 U.S. at 490, 77 S. Ct., at 426. In *Rychlik* the Supreme Court noted that by this provision of the Act Congress conferred upon qualified craft unions the right to "assure members employment security, even if a member should be working temporarily in a craft for which another union is the bargaining representative." *Id.* The observe of the Court's observation is that the provision gives union members the right to be assisted by their union in employment security matters. Grievance and disciplinary proceedings arising out of work in a craft for which another union is the bargaining representative clearly fall within the purview of employment security.

Section 2 and Section 2, Eleventh (c) would clearly prohibit UTU from contracting with MOPAC to prohibit



MOPAC employees working within UTU's craft from joining BLE. Congress conferred upon the plaintiff employees a right to belong to BLE. It follows, then, that UTU and MOPAC cannot lawfully contract to strip MOPAC employees of a basic privilege of union membership. The employee's right to belong to a union of his choice would be hollow if this court enforced a contract between the employer and a rival union which stripped the employee of his right to have his union represent him at company level dispute proceedings with the employer.

No provision in the Act appears to address specifically the issue before us. The language of the Act is notably ambiguous in its many references to the "representative" of an employee. Section 2, Sixth typifies the ambiguity of the Act:

In case of a dispute between a carrier and its or their employees, arising out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, it shall be the duty of the *designated representative* of such carrier or carriers and of such employees, within ten days after the receipt of notice of a desire on the part of either party to confer in respect to such dispute, to specify a time and place at which such conference shall be held. RLA Section 2, Sixth (45 U.S.C. § 152, Sixth). (emphasis added).

The defendants argue, with some logic, that "designated representative" refers to the certified collective bargaining representatives of the employee's craft. On the other hand, "designated representative" reasonably may be interpreted to mean a representative of the union "designated" by the employee, the union of which he is a member. The



Act gives that membership special status; in the spirit of the Act, we adopt the interpretation of the above quoted language which gives full measure to the protected union membership.

There is merit to the defendants' contention that an employee who enjoys the benefits of a collective bargaining agreement must accept the limitations established by that agreement, including exclusive representation provisions. That logical argument must yield to the compelling evidence of Congress's intent to assure each employee the right to enjoy unimpeded the privileges and benefits of membership in the union of his choice.

Our conclusion fosters the Act's explicit objective of providing for the prompt settlement at the company level of all disputes growing out of the application or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. RLA Section 2(4) and Section 2, First and Second (45 U.S.C. § 151a (4) and § 152, First and Second). *See General Committee v. Southern Pacific Co.*, *supra*, 132 F.2d at 198. When an employee elects to be a member of one union rather than another, he is, among other things, designating the union representative in which he wishes to place his trust and confidence with respect to employment matters. The employee reaffirms his preference when he designates his union to represent him at company level dispute proceedings, as the individual plaintiffs did in this case. This relationship of trust and confidence surely will facilitate the dispute resolution process. *Id.* Although representation by a different union pursuant to an exclusive representation provision may yield similar results, the likelihood of settlement at the company level is certainly greater when the employee is represented by his own union.

The defendants assert that the exclusive representation requirement is a necessary and desirable means for a collective bargaining representative to protect the integrity of the collective bargaining agreement. Even minor dispute resolution at the company level implicates the duty of the collective agent to negotiate and protect the terms of employment for the craft it represents, because the resolution of minor disputes often turns on interpretations of the collective agreement. In some instances the resolution of a minor dispute may have implications broader than the immediate case by influencing the practical application of the collective agreement in subsequent cases. *See, e.g., Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley*, 325 U.S. 711, 729-41, 65 S. Ct. 1282, 1292-98 (1945); *General Committee of Adjustment, United Transportation Union v. Burlington Northern, Inc.*, 563 F.2d 1279 (8th Cir. 1977), *cert. denied*, 449 U.S. 826, 101 S. Ct. 88, 66 L.Ed.2d 29 (1980). However, the resolution of many minor disputes at the company level depends upon factual determinations rather than novel interpretations or applications of the collective agreement.

In any event, our ruling does not interfere with the collective bargaining representative's ability to perform its duties. A craft representative may be a necessary party to a company level proceeding potentially affecting other employees, even though the employee directly involved has designated his own union to represent him. We certainly do not hold that the craft representative must be excluded from the company level proceedings in those instances; the craft representative's participation protects the interests and obligations of the collective bargaining union to represent the craft which it is designated to represent. *Accord Burley, supra*, 325 U.S. at

737 n. 35, 65 S. Ct. at 1296-96 n. 35. (to exclude the collective agent from any voice whatever in the collective agreement's interpretation would go too far toward destroying its uniform applications); *McElroy, supra*, at 972 (a "right to participate clause" in union/carrier agreements may be permissible). Furthermore, because the carrier may not unilaterally alter the terms of a collective agreement, the carrier should follow precedent established in proceedings with the collective agent. *See Burlington Northern, supra*, 563 F.2d at 1284.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the exclusive representation provisions in the UTU/MOPAC agreements are inapplicable to the individual plaintiffs in this case and do not bar them from having BLE representation at company level dispute proceedings. We will enter judgment in accordance with these findings.

APPENDIX

AGREEMENT

between

TEXAS PACIFIC-MISSOURI PACIFIC TERMINAL  
RAILROAD OF NEW ORLEANS

and the

UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION

Schedule of Pay Allowed and Rules  
Governing Switchmen

Reprinted

January 1, 1974

ARTICLE 18

Discipline and Grievances

(a) No employee covered by this agreement will be suspended, discharged, or unfavorable entries made against his record without just and sufficient cause, and not until he has had a fair and impartial investigation. Investigations will be held promptly, ordinarily within ten (10) days after the offense has been committed, to which a decision in writing will be rendered within ten (10) days after the investigation or the case will be considered closed. When brought to trial for any offense, the charge will be specified in writing, and the employee charged shall have the right to have another employee covered by this agreement, or a duly accredited representative of the UTU to assist at such investigation, and to procure witnesses to testify in his defense, to examine all papers used in the investigation, and to question all

persons giving evidence in his case. The employe charged and his representative will be furnished a copy of the transcript of the investigation on request. In case he is not satisfied with the result of said investigation, he shall have the right to appeal within ten (10) days, to his superior officer in person, or through his representative, as above specified. (T-32141)

(b) In case his suspension or dismissal is found to be unjust, he shall be reinstated and paid for all time lost. All complaints made by one employe against another, covered by this agreement, must be made in writing.

(c) If an employe is asked to sign a statement, the contents of same should be made entirely clear to him and a copy of such statement furnished to him, if desired.

(d) In the handling of grievances, including time claims, the chairman will inform the officer rendering decision within a reasonable time when a decision is accepted; in the event question in dispute has been handled with the officer having final authority, and his decision is not acceptable, the chairman will so notify him of this fact within a reasonable time.

## ARTICLE 23

### Representation and Rulings

(a) The right to negotiate and interpret schedule rules and agreements covering rates of pay and working conditions of employees covered by this agreement, is vested in the General Grievance Committee of the UTU and the Railroad.

(b) The right of employees covered by this agreement to have the regularly constituted committee of his organ-

ization represent him in the handling of his grievances under the recognized interpretation placed upon the agreement involved between the officials of the Railroad and the General Grievance Committee making same is conceded.

(c) Any rulings made with reference to any Article enumerated herein by the proper Official of the Railroad will be made in writing, and the Chairman of the General Grievance Committee, UTU, will be furnished a copy of said ruling, but said ruling shall not be made effective until agreed to between the parties herein mentioned.

(d) This agreement as rewritten is effective 1-1-74 and supersedes Yard Agreement effective 10-7-57 with the understanding that other written agreements and settlements on matters not covered by this rewritten agreement are not cancelled and that written agreements, rulings, settlements, and interpretations and decisions and awards of tribunals authorized to represent the parties hereto interpreting the rules of the agreement named herein are not superseded by this rewritten agreement.

This agreement shall remain in effect until and unless changed in accordance with the Railway Labor Act. Revised January 1, 1974.

AGREEMENT—August 11, 1948

# SECTION 17—TIME LIMIT ON CLAIMS

Section 17—Time Limit on Claims.

\* \* \* \* \*

(a) All claims or grievances must be presented in writing by or on behalf of the employe involved, to the

officer of the company authorized to receive same, within sixty days from the date of the occurrence on which the claim or grievance is based. Should any such claim or grievance be disallowed, the carrier shall, within sixty days from the date same is filed, notify the employee or his representative of the reasons for such disallowance. If not so notified, the claim or grievance shall be considered valid and settled accordingly, but this shall not be considered as a precedent or waiver of the contentions of the carrier as to other similar claims or grievances.

(b) If a disallowed claim or grievance is to be appealed, such appeal must be taken within sixty days from receipt of notice of disallowance, and the representative of the carrier shall be notified of the rejection of his decision. Failing to comply with this provision the matter shall be considered closed, but this shall not be considered as a precedent or waiver of the contentions of the employees as to other similar claims or grievances.

(c) The procedure outlined in paragraphs (a) and (b) shall govern in appeals taken to each succeeding officer. Decision by the highest officer designated to handle claims and grievances shall be final and binding unless within sixty days after written notice of the decision of said officer he is notified in writing that his decision is not accepted. All claims or grievances involved in a decision of the highest officer shall be barred unless within six months from the date of said officer's decision proceedings are instituted by the employee or his duly authorized representative before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement of the claim or grievance involved. It is understood, however, that the parties may by agreement in any particular case extend the six months period herein referred to.



(d) All rights of a claimant involved in continuing alleged violations of agreement shall, under this rule, be fully protected by continuing to file a claim or grievance for each occurrence (or tour of duty) up to the time when such claim or grievance is disallowed by the first officer of the carrier. With respect to claims and grievances involving an employee held out of service in discipline cases, the original notice of request for reinstatement with pay for time lost shall be sufficient.

(e) This rule recognizes the right of representatives of the organizations parties hereto to file and prosecute claims and grievances for and on behalf of the employees they represent.

(f) This rule shall not apply to requests for leniency.

**APPENDIX C**

**RAILWAY LABOR ACT**

**45 U.S.C. § 151**

**§ 151. *Definitions***

When used in this chapter and section 225 of Title 28 and for the purposes of said chapter and section—

Sixth. The term “representative” means any person or persons, labor union, organization, or corporation designated either by a carrier or group of carriers or by its or their employees, to act for it or them.

## 45 U.S.C. § 152

§ 152. *General duties—Duty of carriers and employees to settle disputes**Consideration of disputes by representatives*

Second. All disputes between a carrier or carriers and its or their employees shall be considered, and, if possible, decided, with all expedition, in conference between representatives designated and authorized so to confer, respectively, by the carrier or carriers and by the employees thereof interested in the dispute.

*Organization and collective bargaining; freedom from interference by carrier; assistance in organizing or maintaining organization by carrier forbidden; deduction of dues from wages forbidden*

Fourth. Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. The majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this chapter. No carrier, its officers, or agents shall deny or in any way question the right of its employees to join, organize, or assist in organizing the labor organization of their choice, and it shall be unlawful for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees, or to use the funds of the carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any labor organization, labor representative, or other agency of collective bargaining, or in performing any work therefor, or to influence or coerce employees in an effort to induce them to

join or remain or not to join or remain members of any labor organization, or to deduct from the wages of employees any dues, fees, assessments, or other contributions payable to labor organizations, or to collect or to assist in the collection of any such dues, fees, assessments, or other contributions: *Provided*, That nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit a carrier from permitting an employee, individually, or local representatives of employees from conferring with management during working hours without loss of time, or to prohibit a carrier from furnishing free transportation to its employees while engaged in the business of a labor organization.

*Disputes as to identity of representatives; designation by  
Mediation Board; secret elections*

Ninth. If any dispute shall arise among a carrier's employees as to who are the representatives of such employees designated and authorized in accordance with the requirements of this chapter, it shall be the duty of the Mediation Board, upon request of either party to the dispute, to investigate such dispute and to certify to both parties, in writing, within thirty days after the receipt of the invocation of its services, the name or names of the individuals or organizations that have been designated and authorized to represent the employees involved in the dispute, and certify the same to the carrier. Upon receipt of such certification the carrier shall treat with the representative so certified as the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this chapter. In such an investigation, the Mediation Board shall be authorized to take a secret ballot of the employees involved, or to utilize any other appropriate method of ascertaining the names of

their duly designated and authorized representatives in such manner as shall insure the choice of representatives by the employees without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by the carrier. In the conduct of any election for the purposes herein indicated the Board shall designate who may participate in the election and establish the rules to govern the election, or may appoint a committee of three neutral persons who after hearing shall within ten days designate the employees who may participate in the election. The Board shall have access to and have power to make copies of the books and records of the carriers to obtain and utilize such information as may be deemed necessary by it to carry out the purposes and provisions of this paragraph.

## 45 U.S.C. § 153

(i) The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases pending and unadjusted on June 21, 1934, shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board with a full statement of the facts and all supporting data bearing upon the disputes.

(j) Parties may be heard either in person, by counsel, or by other representatives, as they may respectively elect, and the several divisions of the Adjustment Board shall give due notice of all hearings to the employee or employees and the carrier or carriers involved in any disputes submitted to them.

(m) The awards of the several divisions of the Adjustment Board shall be stated in writing. A copy of the awards shall be furnished to the respective parties to the controversy, and the awards shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute. In case a dispute arises involving an interpretation of the award, the division of the Board upon request of either party shall interpret the awards in the light of the dispute.

**PART 1206—HANDLING REPRESENTATION  
DISPUTES UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT**

**§ 1206.2** *Percentage of valid authorizations required to  
determine existence of a representation dispute.*

(a) Where the employees involved in a representation dispute are represented by an individual or labor organization, either local or national in scope and are covered by a valid existing contract between such representative and the carrier a showing of proved authorizations (checked and verified as to date, signature, and employment status) from at least a majority of the craft or class must be made before the National Mediation Board will authorize an election or otherwise determine the representation desires of the employees under the provisions of section 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act.

(b) Where the employees involved in a representation dispute are unrepresented, a showing of proved authorizations from at least thirty-five (35) percent of the employees in the craft or class must be made before the National Mediation Board will authorize an election or otherwise determine the representation desires of the employees under the provisions of section 2, Ninth, of the Railway Labor Act.



**APPENDIX D**

**APPENDIX**

**AGREEMENT**

between

**TEXAS PACIFIC - MISSOURI PACIFIC TERMINAL  
RAILROAD OF NEW ORLEANS**

and the

**UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION**

**Schedule of Pay Allowed and Rules  
Governing Switchmen**

**Reprinted**

**January 1, 1974**

**ARTICLE 18**

**Discipline and Grievances**

(a) No employee covered by this agreement will be suspended, discharged, or unfavorable entries made against his record without just and sufficient cause, and not until he has had a fair and impartial investigation. Investigations will be held promptly, ordinarily within ten (10) days after the offense has been committed, to which a decision in writing will be rendered within ten (10) days after the investigation or the case will be considered closed. When brought to trial for any offense, the charge will be specified in writing, and the employee charged shall have the right to have another employee covered by this agreement, or a duly accredited representative of the UTU to assist at such investigation, and

to procure witnesses to testify in his defense, to examine all papers used in the investigation, and to question all persons giving evidence in his case. The employe charged and his representative will be furnished a copy of the transcript of the investigation on request. In case he is not satisfied with the result of said investigation, he shall have the right to appeal within ten (10) days, to his superior officer in person, or through his representative, as above specified. (T-32141)

(b) In case his suspension or dismissal is found to be unjust, he shall be reinstated and paid for all time lost. All complaints made by one employe against another, covered by this agreement, must be made in writing.

(c) If an employe is asked to sign a statement, the contents of same should be made entirely clear to him and a copy of such statement furnished to him, if desired.

(d) In the handling of grievances, including time claims, the chairman will inform the officer rendering decision within a reasonable time when a decision is accepted; in the event question in dispute has been handled with the officer having final authority, and his decision is not acceptable, the chairman will so notify him of this fact within a reasonable time.

**APPENDIX E****ARTICLE 23****Representation and Rulings**

(a) The right to negotiate and interpret schedule rules and agreements covering rates of pay and working conditions of employes covered by this agreement, is vested in the General Grievance Committee of the UTU and the Railroad.

(b) The right of employes covered by this agreement to have the regularly constituted committee of his organization represent him in the handling of his grievances under the recognized interpretation placed upon the agreement involved between the officials of the Railroad and the General Grievance Committee making same is conceded.

(c) Any rulings made with reference to any Article enumerated herein by the proper Official of the Railroad will be made in writing, and the Chairman of the General Grievance Committee, UTU, will be furnished a copy of said ruling, but said ruling shall not be made effective until agreed to between the parties herein mentioned.

(d) This agreement as rewritten is effective 1-1-74 and supersedes Yard Agreement effective 10-7-57 with the understanding that other written agreements and settlements on matters not covered by this rewritten agreement are not cancelled and that written agreements, rulings, settlements, and interpretations and decisions and awards of tribunals authorized to represent the parties hereto interpreting the rules of the agreement named herein are not superseded by this rewritten agreement.

This agreement shall remain in effect until and unless changed in accordance with the Railway Labor Act.  
Revised January 1, 1974.

**APPENDIX F**

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA**

**CIVIL ACTION NO. 84-700  
SECTION "H" MAG. DIV. NO. 2**

**W. G. TAYLOR, K. P. BROCKHOEFT, A. J. RUIZ,  
WAYNE A. SEPCICH and BROTHERHOOD  
OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS**

**v.**

**MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY  
and UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION**

**AFFIDAVIT OF O. B. SAYERS**

BEFORE ME, the duly undersigned authority, personally came and appeared O. B. Sayers, who, after first being sworn, states that the following facts are true and correct and within his personal knowledge:

(1) I am presently employed at the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company as Assistant Vice President, Labor Relations. In my position as Assistant Vice President, I am the highest officer at the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (MoPac) designated to handle disputes arising under the various collective bargaining agreements between MoPac and the respective unions that have members working for MoPac.

(2) The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) and the United Transportation Union (UTU) are two of the thirteen standard railroad unions which represent various MoPac employees working in the various crafts

or classes. Three other unions, which are not standard railroad unions, also represent some MoPac employees.

(3) Defendant UTU is the duly designated collective bargaining representative pursuant to the Railway Labor Act for employees of defendant MoPac working in the craft or class of conductors, trainmen, and switchmen.

MoPac and the UTU entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement governing the rates of pay, rules, and working conditions for the craft or class of conductors, trainmen, yardmen, and switchmen, including seniority provisions, discipline and discipline investigation rules, and machinery for the resolution of disputes involving the interpretation and application of the Collective Bargaining Agreements relating to those individuals. A copy of the governing Collective Bargaining Agreement between MoPac and the UTU is attached as Exhibit "A" hereto.

(4) Plaintiff BLE is the duly designated collective bargaining representative under the Railway Labor Act for employees of defendant MoPac working in the craft or class of engineers. MoPac entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the BLE governing the rates of pay, rules, and working conditions for the craft of engineers; this collective bargaining agreement also controls seniority provisions, discipline and investigation rules, and machinery for the resolution of disputes involving the interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreements related to those engineers. A copy of the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "B".

(5) The named individual plaintiffs are presently employed by the defendant Missouri Pacific at its Avondale,

Louisiana yard, and have seniority in the craft of switchmen.

(6) These named individual plaintiffs were originally hired as switchmen by the Texas Pacific-Missouri Pacific Terminal Railroad of New Orleans, which was a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant MoPac. On December 31, 1977, the TP-MP was merged into the MoPac.

(7) Prior to August 1983, no switchmen working as such on the TP-MP or MoPac, including those who have the right to or had acquired engineer seniority, had sought to be represented by the BLE in the handling of claims or grievances on the property arising within the craft of switchmen.

(8) Plaintiff Taylor worked as a switchman from September 23, 1967 through March 23, 1980, and then worked as an engineman from March 24, 1980 to August 16, 1982. From August 1982 until the present time, Mr. Taylor has worked continuously as a switchman.

(9) While working as switchman, the rates of pay, rules, and working conditions are governed by the agreement between the UTU and MoPac. The agreements between the BLE and MoPac do not govern the rates of pay, rules, and working conditions of individuals working as switchmen. There are separate seniority rosters for switchmen and enginemen.

(10) While working as an engineman, the rates of pay, rules, and working conditions are governed by the agreement between plaintiff BLE and MoPac. The agreement between the UTU and MoPac does not govern the rates of pay, rules, and working conditions of the individuals who are working in engine service.



(11) Affiant further states that engineers working for Missouri Pacific are qualified on the mechanical rules and functions of locomotives, while switchmen are not. While working as switchmen, employees are prohibited from operating locomotives.

(12) On or about January 1, 1984, all of the individual plaintiffs were working as switchmen.

(13) In or about January 1984, MoPac convened a hearing to consider the charges filed against the plaintiffs Taylor, Ruiz, and Sepcich with respect to possible misconduct while working as switchmen. MoPac convened a company level investigation in accordance with the MoPac-UTU Collective Bargaining Agreement governing switchmen (Exhibit A).

(14) The individual plaintiffs sought to have BLE local chairman W. L. LaNassa as their representative at the company level investigation for possible misconduct while working as switchmen.

(15) MoPac advised the BLE that, based upon its interpretation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between MoPac and the UTU, the BLE would not be allowed to represent the individual plaintiffs at the company level investigation. MoPac further advised the BLE that the collective bargaining agreement between MoPac and the UTU exclusively governs claims and grievances at the company level for employees while working as switchmen. MoPac, however, has not refused to allow the BLE to represent individual plaintiffs at levels beyond company level proceedings. Similarly, MoPac has not refused to allow the BLE to represent employees who are working as engineers at company level proceedings.

(16) MoPac's decision not to allow the BLE to represent switchmen at company level disciplinary proceedings is based upon MoPac's interpretation of Articles 18 and 23 involving discipline, grievances, and representation of switchmen. In addition, MoPac's position is supported by the fact that such grievance and disciplinary proceedings before the carrier have been handled in the same manner in the past, and, thus, this approach represents the usual manner for the handling of grievance and disciplinary matters.

(17) Affiant further notes that the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the BLE and MoPac similarly provides that only the BLE will represent engineers working for the Missouri Pacific in disciplinary and grievance proceedings on the property.

(18) MoPac believes that based upon its interpretation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between MoPac and the UTU, it would be a flagrant violation of the UTU agreement to allow the BLE to represent switchmen at disciplinary and grievance proceedings at the company level. Likewise, it would be violative of the agreement between MoPac and the UTU to allow any of the other fourteen unions that have agreements with MoPac to represent switchmen in discipline or grievance matters while those individuals are working as switchmen for the Missouri Pacific.

(19) Affiant states that he has reviewed the Affidavit of D. F. Riley, who is the General Chairman of the General Committee of Adjustment, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. A copy of Mr. Riley's Affidavit, which was submitted by the BLE in the case of *Peters v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation and BLE*, No.

83-3431 on the docket of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, is attached hereto as Exhibit "1".

(20) MoPac agrees with Mr. Riley's sworn statements that the collective bargaining agreements between a carrier and a union, such as the collective bargaining agreement between MoPac and the UTU, require that the carrier cannot allow any other union to handle claims or grievances at the company level involving employees covered by the agreement relative to that specific craft.

(21) MoPac agrees with the statements of BLE Chairman Riley (Exhibit "1") that if a rival union is permitted to handle claims or grievances at the company level, the collective bargaining process would be undermined. Such a procedure likewise would impact on specific contractual provisions negotiated between the carrier and the respective union, without the signatory union's approval as a collective bargaining representative.

(22) There did not exist shuttling between crafts by the plaintiffs in this case. As indicated above, very few employees of the MoPac have even worked in more than one craft.

(23) The Missouri Pacific believes that it would be extremely disruptive to the business of the Missouri Pacific and would abrogate the substantive portions of contractual agreements between MoPac and the respective unions if a rival union could represent an employee in a company level grievance or disciplinary proceeding that arose from the employee's conduct in a craft not subject to the collective bargaining agreement of the rival union. More importantly, if the BLE is allowed to represent switchmen in disciplinary proceedings at the com-

pany level, the BLE would be involved with the interpretation of the UTU agreement whenever the BLE represented switchmen; such a result is illogical because the resolution of such proceedings frequently depends upon what the carrier and signatory union intended when they negotiated the collective bargaining agreement.

(24) Affiant believes that if the BLE is allowed to represent switchmen in grievance and disciplinary proceedings on the property, it would foster the pursuit of frivolous cases by BLE in its effort to enhance the BLE's appeal to individuals that are not represented by the BLE. Such an approach would lead to increased difficulty for MoPac and would prevent MoPac from ensuring that claims or disciplinary proceedings are handled on a consistent basis.

(25) The problems and administrative burdens that would develop if the BLE can represent switchmen at a company disciplinary proceeding would be aggravated at MoPac because the other fourteen unions at MoPac likewise may seek to represent switchmen and others, which would be extremely disruptive for the Railroad.

(26) Missouri Pacific believes that the representational or jurisdictional issues involved in this dispute should properly be considered by the National Mediation Board pursuant to the terms of the Railway Labor Act. BLE recently recognized the propriety of initially submitting representational or jurisdictional issues to the National Mediation Board, as evidenced by BLE's application asserting a representation dispute with respect to switchmen employed by Missouri Pacific; a copy of the NMB's ruling on the BLE's application is attached as Exhibit 2 to this affidavit. In summary, the representational and

jurisdictional disputes in this matter should be referred to the National Mediation Board, and any contract interpretation issues referred to the National Railroad Adjustment Board pursuant to Section 2 and Section 3, respectively, of the Railway Labor Act.

/s/ O. B. SAYERS  
O. B. Sayers

SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED  
BEFORE ME THIS 3rd  
DAY OF DECEMBER, 1984.

/s/ J. J. MARRA  
Notary Public

My Commission expires July 18, 1988.

J. J. MARRA - NOTARY PUBLIC  
State of Missouri, Commissioned  
within the County of St. Louis

